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NOTES
Between South Beach and a Hard Place: The
Underfunding of the Miami-Dade Public
Defender's Office and the Resulting
Ethical Double Standard
STEPHANIE L. MCALISTERt
That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have
the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the
widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not
luxuries. The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be
deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but
it is in ours.
-U.S. Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black, Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
I. INTRODUCTION
Few points of constitutional law captivate the American public like
the holding of Gideon v. Wainwright. Conveyed to the public via history
class and television Miranda warnings, the decision represents the rare
intersection of modem popular culture and constitutional philosophy. It
also represents the less publicized interplay between the state's duties to
the accused and the appointed lawyer's duties to the client. It is this
interplay that has become the center of a crisis for the Miami-Dade Pub-
lic Defender.
Underfunding of the Miami-Dade Public Defender's Office' creates
a substantial risk that its lawyers will be unable to fulfill ethical obliga-
tions to clients,2 as defined by the Florida Rules of Professional Con-
t J.D. 2010, Articles and Comments Editor of the University of Miami Law Review.
Thanks to all four of my parents, David and Cathy McAlister and Sandy and Doug Galloway, for
their encouragement, support, and occasional financial contributions. Thanks to Jonel Newman for
her advice and help with this note.
1. The Public Defender for Miami-Dade County is also known (perhaps more technically) as
the Public Defender for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida. However, the Eleventh Judicial
Circuit encompasses only Miami-Dade County, so the terms are used interchangeably. The Public
Defender's Office for Miami-Dade County/the Eleventh Judicial Circuit is also commonly
abbreviated as PD- 11, which will also be used throughout this paper.
2. In fact, the Miami-Dade Public Defender has repeatedly publicly stated that the office's
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duct.3 The underfunding of the public defender specifically affects the
obligations relating to competence,4 diligence,5 communication with cli-
ents,6 and conflicts of interest.7 The Rules apply to all Florida lawyers,
regardless of whether they work in law firms, as in-house counsel for a
corporation, or for the government.8
In spite of this, the practical meaning of the Rules is different for
lawyers working in the Miami-Dade Public Defender's office, who are
rarely disciplined by the Florida Bar, than for most other practicing
attorneys. A public defender's failure to comply with the Rules is likely
overlooked because it is involuntary or probably often inevitable. Con-
sistent underfunding of the Florida judiciary has caused a simultaneous
increase in caseloads and decrease in personnel in county public
defender's offices. This forces attorneys in the public defender's offices
into an ethical quagmire, requiring them to trade time spent on one case
for the interests of a different client. While that attorney is certainly less
blameworthy than the private attorney who bills clients for time spent on
the golf course, the blameworthiness of the attorney is ultimately irrele-
vant to the true beneficiaries of the Rules-the clients. The clients of
the overloaded public defender and the willfully neglectful private attor-
ney find themselves in the exact same situation. Both may receive rep-
resentation that is inadequate, but only one group receives redress
through the Rules that were created to protect them all. This note argues
for the elimination of this ethical double standard through adequate
funding of Miami-Dade's Public Defender.
A helpful starting point for analysis is the history of the develop-
ment of the problem, beginning with the development of the doctrine
regarding the right underlying the system itself. Part II of this note then
surveys the funding crisis for indigent defense on a national and state
level. Part I addresses the problem within Miami-Dade County, com-
paring recommended caseload standards with actual caseloads at PD-Il
lawyers are unable to comply with state ethical rules because of high caseloads. See, e.g., Motion
To Appoint Other Counsel in Appointed Noncapital Felony Cases Due to Conflict of Interest,
State v. Munoz, No. F08-2314 (Fla. Cir. Ct. June 24, 2008) [hereinafter Public Defender's
Motion]; Susannah A. Nesmith, Dade Public Defender: Caseload Is Untenable, MIAMI HERALD,
July 31, 2008, at BI; Jan Pudlow, PD-I1 Grapples with Increased Caseloads and High Rate of
Public Defender Turnover, FLA. BAR NEWS, Nov. 15, 2008, at 1.
3. See RuLEs REGULATING THE FLA. BAR ch. 4 (2008) (listing the Florida's Rules of
Professional Conduct).
4. See FLA. RULEs OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 4-1.1 (2008).
5. See id. at R. 4-1.3.
6. See id. at R. 4-1.4.
7. See id. at R. 4-1.7.
8. See Shreiber v. Rowe, 814 So. 2d 396, 398 (Fla. 2002) ("The public defender is an
advocate, who, once appointed, owes a duty only to his client. His role does not differ from that of
a privately retained counsel." (quoting Windsor v. Gibson, 424 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982))).
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and discussing the ethical rules implicated. Part IV offers potential solu-
tions to the problem, and Part V ultimately concludes that the answer is
simply adequate funding.
A. A Brief History of the 6th Amendment Right to Counsel that
Underlies Modem Indigent Defense Systems
The indigent defense system as we know it is a fairly recent devel-
opment. For most of our country's history, "indigent defense" was not a
widely recognized legal concept. Instead, indigent status generally
meant no defense (by an attorney) was available. Only over the past
eighty years has there been a recognized right to counsel for indigent
defendants in the United States.
In 1932, the Supreme Court determined that due process requires
representation by counsel for indigent defendants on trial for capital
offenses.9 For the next thirty years, only defendants whose crimes were
punishable by death had a right to counsel in the United States. In the
seminal case Gideon v. Wainwright, decided in 1963, the Supreme Court
held that the Sixth Amendment provides indigent defendants in serious
criminal cases in state courts with a Constitutional right to representa-
tion by counsel.' ° The same year, the right to counsel was expanded to
include indigent defendants appealing their first conviction."
While the existence of a right to counsel is the baseline of the guar-
anteed due process for indigent defendants, the right means little if the
counsel provided is permitted to be inadequate. The Supreme Court rec-
ognized this principle in Strickland v. Washington, where it held that the
Sixth Amendment's guarantee of representation is a guarantee to repre-
sentation that is effective.2 The Court stated, "An accused is entitled to
be assisted by an attorney, whether retained or appointed, who plays the
role necessary to ensure that the trial is fair."''
3
However, this guarantee of effectiveness is narrower than it may
seem. The standard articulated by the Court to judge the effectiveness of
counsel is relatively difficult for defendants to meet. That standard is
"whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced
a just result."' 4 The Court imposed a two-pronged test to determine if
counsel has been ineffective: (1) counsel's performance must have been
9. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
10. 372 U.S. 335, 339, 345 (1963).
11. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356-58 (1963).
12. 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
13. Id. at 685.
14. Id. at 686.
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deficient (counsel must have "made errors so serious that counsel was
not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment") and (2) the inadequate performance prejudiced the
defense ("Counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of
a fair trial."). 5
The first prong, deficiency of performance, is measured by an
objective standard of reasonableness "under prevailing professional
norms."'16 However, courts recognize that there is a range of conduct that
is acceptable by attorneys. The Strickland Court held that there is there-
fore a "strong presumption" that counsel's conduct was professionally
reasonable. 7 The second prong, prejudice to the defense, is only met
when the outcome of the proceeding would have been different if coun-
sel's performance had not been deficient. 8 The defendant has the bur-
den of proof to show that each prong has been met. 9 These factors
combine to make effective assistance claims difficult for defendants to
win.
Thus, the current understanding of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel is that it applies to all defendants facing possible incarceration,
and that the only real guarantee is for counsel that is not so defective that
it undermines the entire judicial process. These are the conceptions of
the rights of the accused that underlie modern indigent defense systems,
including the Miami-Dade Public Defender's Office.
B. Prospective Protection of Defendants' Sixth Amendment Rights
It is important to note that not every Sixth Amendment issue is
handled the same way. Prospective protection of defendants' right to
counsel (the prevention of future harm) is handled differently than
attempts to create a retrospective remedy for violation of the right (the
compensation of past harm). While it is the most important measure of
effective assistance of counsel in American jurisprudence, the Strickland
test applies only when a convicted defendant seeks the remedy of rever-
sal of his conviction after his attorney has failed to provide effective
assistance.2 ° At that point, the parties have already conducted an entire
trial. Concerns relating to finality, the deterrent effect that extensive
post-trial burdens might have on counsel deciding whether to accept
15. Id. at 687.
16. Id. at 688.
17. Id. at 689.
18. See id. at 694 ("The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.").
19. Id. at 687.
20. See id.
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cases, and the independence of counsel justify a deferential approach to
judging the conduct of counsel after the fact.2'
However, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted that where a
lawyer seeks to protect a client's constitutional rights before the trial is
over and before a client has been convicted, the Strickland test is not the
appropriate measure of performance or conduct. In Luckey v. Harris, a
plaintiff class of indigent persons accused of crimes in Georgia alleged
that systemic flaws in the state indigent defense system violated their
Sixth Amendment rights.22 The court held that the plaintiffs did not have
to show the "future inevitability of ineffective assistance of counsel" to
state a claim for relief (i.e., that the Strickland standards did not
apply).23 The Court reasoned that the Sixth Amendment also protects
rights that do not affect the outcome of a trial, so that "deficiencies that
do not meet the 'ineffectiveness' standard may nonetheless violate a
defendant's rights under the sixth amendment. In the post-trial context,
such errors may be deemed harmless because they did not affect the
outcome of the trial."' 24 Thus, the traditional Strickland requirement of a
showing of prejudice is not necessary for cases in which a defendant
seeks prospective protection because the same concerns are not impli-
cated. "Whether an accused has been prejudiced by the denial of a right
is an issue that relates to relief-whether the defendant is entitled to
have his or her conviction overturned-rather than to a question of
whether such a right exists and can be protected prospectively. 25
The standard for plaintiffs seeking prospective relief in Sixth
Amendment cases is thus significantly lower, at least in federal courts
within the Eleventh Circuit. The appropriate standard for prospective
relief claims is that plaintiffs must show "the likelihood of substantial
and immediate irreparable injury, and the inadequacy of remedies at
law."2 6 In Luckey, the Court held that plaintiffs met this standard by
alleging
systemic delays in the appointment of counsel deny them their sixth
amendment right to the representation of counsel at critical stages in
the criminal process, hamper the ability of their counsel to defend
them, . . .that their attorneys are denied investigative and expert
resources necessary to defend them effectively, [and] that their attor-
neys are pressured by courts to hurry their case to trial or to enter a
21. Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1017 (11 th Cir. 1988), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Luckey v. Miller, 976 F.2d 673 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Sirickland, 466 U.S. at 690).
22. Id. at 1013.
23. Id. at 1016-17.
24. Id. at 1017.
25. Id.
26. Id. (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502 (1974)).
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guilty plea ....
As explained in later sections of this paper, these types of allegations
mirror the reality faced by public defenders in Miami-Dade County and
throughout the country.
In Florida, the First District Court of Appeal has taken a similar
approach to a Sixth Amendment claim by an indigent defendant before
trial. In Scott v. State, the court stated, "Conflicts of interest are best
addressed before a lawyer laboring under such a conflict does any harm
to his or her client(s)'s interests. Any prejudicial effect on the adequacy
of counsel's representation is presumed harmful. Viewed prospectively,
any substantial risk of harm is deemed prejudicial."28 The conflict of
interest claim in Scott was based on the public defender's concurrent
representation of a key witness in the defendant's case, not systemic
problems in the indigent defense structure.29 However, the cause of the
harm is irrelevant; what triggers the prospective relief standard articu-
lated in Luckey and Scott is the timing of the claim-early in the case,
before the harm to the client has occurred. Ideally, effective use of the
standard prevents the harm.
Prospective relief claims like those in Luckey and Scott reflect the
intersection of the constitutional and ethical obligations of appointed
counsel. Under the Strickland test, a defendant's attorney can fail to
meet his ethical obligations, but nevertheless be found to have been
"effective" because his deficiencies did not affect the trial's outcome.
However, the standard articulated and applied in Luckey suggests that at
the pre-trial stage, the constitutional and ethical obligations (at least in
the Eleventh Circuit) come closer to converging. The plaintiff's claims
in Luckey are similar to the types of complaints made to the Florida Bar
regarding lawyers' ethical duties to clients. For example, the claim in
Luckey that appointed counsel is unable to investigate cases or access
experts is analogous to Bar complaints that an attorney has failed to
provide competent representation through adequate preparation and
investigation, 30 and to act diligently. 3  The claim in Luckey that
27. Id. at 1018.
28. Scott v. State, 991 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).
29. Id.
30. See Fla. Bar v. Jordan, 705 So. 2d 1387, 1388-89, 1391 (Fla. 1998) (per curiam)
(imposing a one-year suspension for repeated failures to prepare a client's case and to meet
deadlines, which ultimately resulted in dismissal of the case); Fla. Bar v. Roberts, 689 So. 2d
1049, 1051 (Fla. 1997) (per curiam) (holding that failure to provide competent representation is
ethical violation even in the absence of intentional misrepresentation or fraud); Fla. Bar v.
Sandstrom, 609 So. 2d 583, 583-84 (Fla. 1992) (per curiam) (holding that inadequate
investigation into cause of death of client's alleged murder victim constitutes failure to adequately
prepare for representation of client and is grounds for sixty-day suspension).
31. See Fla. Bar v. Smith, 866 So. 2d 41, 46-47, 49 (Fla. 2004) (per curiam) (stating that
[Vol. 64:13171322
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appointed counsel is pressured by the courts to rush cases is akin to a
complaint that a lawyer has breached his ethical duty to remain free
from conflicts of interest and maintain independent professional judg-
ment.32 This convergence demonstrates the importance of enabling attor-
neys to meet their ethical obligations-an attorney that fails to meet
ethical standards is unlikely to succeed in meeting constitutional stan-
dards. Thus, the Rules of Professional Conduct can serve not only as a
regulator of attorney behavior, but as an additional safeguard for indi-
gent defendants' Sixth Amendment rights.
II. THE PROBLEM: INADEQUATE FUNDING FOR
LOCAL INDIGENT DEFENSE
A. The Problem on a National Scale
Indigent defense systems nationwide are chronically underfunded,
forcing individual lawyers to carry excessive caseloads.33 Studies have
shown that as a result of systematic underfunding of the nation's indi-
gent defense offices, "most state indigent defense systems across the
country are consistently operating in crisis mode, barely able to function
and increasingly unable to handle the number of cases that cycle through
those systems each day."'34 Examples of public defenders forced to pro-
vide inadequate defense due to underfunding and the subsequent exces-
sive caseloads are rampant.3 As of November 2008, public defenders'
offices in seven states were refusing to take on new cases or had sued to
limit them, on the grounds that excessive workloads made it impossible
to fulfill their constitutional duties.36 In Missouri, the indigent defense
pattern of neglect over one and a half years, even without any prior disciplinary record, may
constitute violation of ethical rules, including diligence requirement); Fla. Bar v. Whitaker, 596
So. 2d 672, 673-74 (Fla. 1992) (per curiam) (imposing public reprimand where lawyer failed to
file suit on behalf of client before the claim was time-barred).
32. See In re Certification of Conflict, 636 So. 2d 18, 19 (Fla. 1994); In re Order on
Prosecution of Criminal Appeals, 561 So. 2d 1130, 1135 (Fla. 1990) (per curiam).
33. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULL. No. NCJ
184932, INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES IN LARGE CoUrNTIES, 1999 (2000), available at http://
bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=996 (surveying indigent criminal defense services in
most populous counties).
34. Jessica Hafkin, A Lawyer's Ethical Obligation To Refuse New Cases or To Withdraw
from Existing Ones When Faced with Excessive Caseloads That Prevent Him from Providing
Competent and Diligent Representation to Indigent Defendants, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 657,
658 (2007).
35. See generally Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases,
a National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1035-36 (2006) (discussing examples of specific
public defender offices providing inadequate defense, as well as entire indigent defense systems
that have been "viewed as essentially incapable of preserving fundamental constitutional rights").
36. Erik Eckholm, Citing Workload, Public Lawyers Reject New Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9,
2008, at Al.
13232010]
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system has not increased its staff in eight years, while its annual
caseload has risen by 12,000. 37 In New York City, funding for criminal
defense fell by $2.7 million in 2008, while the annual number of cases
has grown by 16,000 since 2006.38 Kentucky's state public advocate,
who recently sued to limit public defender caseloads in his state,
explained the magnitude of the crisis: "Since Gideon, I don't remember
a time when the challenges to adequate representation have been so
great."39
The most alarming result of the nationwide problems plaguing indi-
gent defense systems is that, contrary to the purpose of both the Sixth
Amendment and the very concept of indigent defense, innocent people
may go to jail while the actual perpetrator remains free.4 ° Innocent
defendants, recognizing that their lawyers are unable to spend the
required time to put on a real defense, may feel pressure to plead guilty
rather than risk a conviction at trial."' This type of risk-benefit analysis
forced upon defendants is constitutionally unacceptable, and facilitating
that choice for clients is ethically unacceptable for attorneys. The wide-
spread existence of inadequately funded public defenders' offices
nationwide points to an alarming conclusion: Although the right to rep-
resentation by effective counsel exists doctrinally, the current state of
inadequate funding for indigent defense systems nationwide threatens its
existence in reality.42
B. The Problem in Florida
The Sunshine State is not exempt from the growing nationwide
indigent defense crisis. The problem in Florida is similar to the problems
experienced across the country-too little money, too few attorneys, and
too many defendants.
At the heart of the problem is inadequate funding. Funding for Flor-
ida's judicial branch as a whole, including its public defender's offices,
is allocated by the Legislature, and the judiciary has no control over the
amount appropriated.43 The absence of any real influence in appropria-
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, ABA, GIDEON'S
Broken Promise 16 (2004) [hereinafter GIDEON'S Broken Promise].
41. Eckholm, supra note 36.
42. See Note, Effectively Ineffective: The Failure of Courts To Address Underfunded Indigent
Defense Systems, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1734-35 (2005) (explaining how the practical
consequences of inadequate funding interfere with the right to counsel).
43. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 14 (providing that the court systems will be funded from "state
revenues appropriated by general law" and "[tihe judiciary shall have no power to fix
appropriations"); see also Jordana Mishory, Foster Care, Court Funding Top the Docket for Fla.
(Vol. 64:13171324
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tions decisions may explain why the state judiciary's budget constitutes
only seven tenths of one percent of the state's $66 billion budget.4'
Despite this, court spending has been reduced by $44 million in the past
two years, causing a nine percent reduction in personnel. 45 Florida
Supreme Court Justice Peggy A. Quince, who ascended to that office in
July 2008, publicly stated that resolving court funding problems is a top
priority during her two-year term as Chief.4 6 Quince urges legislators "to
treat the judiciary as a co-equal third branch of government, not another
state agency."47
The inadequate funding for the judicial branch as a whole has trans-
lated into major difficulties for the state's indigent defense systems.48
However, underfunding is not a new problem for Florida's public
defenders.49 Most notably, in 2005 the Broward Public Defender forbade
his attorneys from advising indigent clients to plead guilty at arraign-
ment without first having "meaningful contact" with them.5" The policy
was the result of a determination that public defenders are often ill-
informed about clients' cases when advising them whether or not to
accept a plea.5' At that time, about eighty percent of all criminal defend-
ants in Broward County pled guilty at arraignment. 52 Public Defender
Howard Finkelstein explained how an excessively high caseload trans-
lates into a so-called "meet, greet, and plead" policy: "They meet with
an attorney for sixty seconds, then they plead guilty and surrender their
rights."53
Although the state has seen extremely serious problems in indigent
High Court's New Chief, DAILY Bus. REV., July 1, 2008, at I (discussing Florida judges' requests
for court funding from legislature).
44. Jan Pudlow, Quince Takes Court's Helm, FLA. BAR NEWS, July 15, 2008, at 1, 9.
45. Chief Justice Quince's Initiatives, FLA. BAR J., Oct. 1, 2008, at 19, 20.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. While this paper focuses on how Florida's funding crisis has affected its public defenders,
it is not meant to detract from how profoundly the lack of funding has affected other areas of the
criminal justice system. Prosecutors, police, prison personnel, and the courts themselves are
struggling to continue operations in the face of tighter budgets. For a brief explanation of how
these other state offices and agencies have been affected, see Gary Blankenship, Criminal Law
Section Sets Out To Find Court Budget Solutions, FLA. BAR NEWS, Aug. 15, 2008, at 1.
49. For discussions of similar problems experienced in Florida over the past twenty years,
see, for example, Bob Levenson, So Many Clients-So Little Time: Public Defenders Ask To Drop
Cases, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 5, 1989, at B 1; John Pacenti, Massive Cuts Loom over State's
Judicial System, PALM BEACH POST, Oct. 5, 2001, at 1A; and Andres Viglucci, Public Defender
Seeks Relief from 500 Juvenile Cases, MiAmi HERALD, Oct. 26, 1992, at 2B.
50. Dan Christensen, Broward PD Says No to Instant Plea Deals, DArLY Bus. RaV., June 6,
2005, at 1.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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defense before, the current crisis is unique. Legislative action in the past
three years has drastically changed the landscape of indigent defense in
Florida. Before 2007, private attorneys were appointed from a registry to
represent indigent defendants when the local public defender's office
had a conflict of interest.54 That year, the Legislature created a system of
regional offices, the Offices of Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional
Counsel, to handle such conflict cases.55 The Legislature provided that
the state's five offices be staffed by a total of 384 lawyers, paralegals
and investigators, who would handle about 33,000 cases a year, an
arrangement critics called "unrealistic." 6
Under the new system, private attorneys are only appointed from a
registry (as in the old system) in cases where both the public defender
and the regional offices are conflicted.57 The fees that may be paid to the
private attorneys are capped for each category of case, ranging from
$1,000 for misdemeanors to $15,000 for death penalty cases.5 8 Com-
pared to the old system, where some attorneys billed the state over
$150,000 for their representation of indigent defendants in capital cases,
the maximum fees fail to adequately compensate the specially trained
attorneys who handle death penalty cases.59 The arrangement drew criti-
cism from the Bar before it was even put into effect-attorneys called
the fees "unreasonably low" and some predicted that private attorneys
would simply stop accepting capital cases altogether.6'
The effects of the 2007 re-structuring were worsened by drastic
budget cuts in 2008. The 2007-2008 fiscal year saw three rounds of
budget cuts, including "current year cuts."6 1 These types of budget cuts
occur after the current year's personnel and operations have already
been planned for and begun operations; thus, such "current year cuts"
often result in substantial disruption.62 The 2008 budget cuts caused the
state court system to eliminate the equivalent of 268.25 full-time posi-
tions, 63 and prompted concern from Florida agencies relating to law
54. Susannah A. Nesmith & Trenton Daniel, Legal Plan for Poor Faulted, MIAMI HERALD,
May 5, 2007, at lB.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. (quoting Miami lawyer Bruce Fleisher as saying the process in death cases is "long
and 'gut wrenching"' and that "no one's going to do that for $15,000").
60. Id.
61. Impact of the Budget Cuts on the Court System, FULL COURT PRESS (State Courts Sys. of
Fla., Tallahassee, Fla.), Summer 2008, at 2, available at http://www.flcourts.org/gen-public/pubs/
bin/fcp.summer08.pdf
62. Id.
63. Id.
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enforcement, as well as the business community.64
Public Defender's offices across the state are experiencing difficul-
ties as a result of the budget cuts. During a fifteen-month period in 2007
and 2008, the Fifth Circuit Public Defender's Office65 was forced to
eliminate five full-time attorney positions and leave another five posi-
tions unfilled.66 The Eighth Circuit Public Defender stated, "We are
struggling to provide even minimally acceptable services to the clients
who are assigned to us."'67 By June 2008, the Miami-Dade Public
Defender began refusing to represent certain defendants because of the
budget cuts and public defenders in Broward, Pasco, and Pinellas Coun-
ties were threatening similar action.68 In November of that year, a
Twelfth Circuit judge in Manatee County forced attorneys to take crimi-
nal cases because both the Public Defender and Regional Counsel
offices were conflicted, and there were not enough private attorneys
listed on the appointment registry.69 One appointed lawyer claimed that
if his placement on the so-called "Involuntary Appointment List"
required him to represent his assigned indigent client in a RICO case, it
may bankrupt him and shut down his practice.7" The affected lawyers
blame the Legislature for their predicament, stating that if the Public
Defender's Office and Regional Counsel offices were adequately
funded, there would be no shortage of available attorneys.7'
64. Gary Blankenship, Building Support for Court Funding, FLA. BAR NEWS, Nov. 15, 2008,
at 1, I.
65. The Fifth Judicial Circuit encompasses Citrus, Hernando, Lake Marion, and Sumter
Counties. See Florida State Circuit Courts, http:llwww.flcourts.orglcourtslcircuitlcircuit.shtml
(last visited May 31, 2010).
66. Suevon Lee, What Is the Breaking Point for the Public Defender's Office?, OCALA STAR-
BANNER, Oct. 6, 2008, available at http://www.ocala.com/article/20081006/NEWS/810050341/
1001/NEWSOI ?Title=breaking-point-forPublicDefendersOffice (last visited Aug. 15, 2010).
67. Blankenship, supra note 64, at 5.
68. Susannah E. Nesmith, Dade Defender's Office Refuses Cases, MIAMI HERALD, June 24,
2008.
69. Gary Blankenship, Lawyers Being Forced To Take Criminal Cases, FLA. BAR NEWS,
Nov. 15, 2008, at 1, 16; see also Could Compelled Appointments Be Coming to Your Circuit?,
FLA. BAR NEWS, Nov. 15, 2008, at 17, 17.
70. Blankenship, supra note 69, at 16. The lawyer, Gregory Hagopian, successfully petitioned
the Second District Court of Appeal to quash the denial of his motion to withdraw as counsel in
the RICO case on the ground that he could not ethically represent his client. Hagopian v. Justice
Admin. Comm'n, 18 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009).
71. Blankenship, supra note 69, at 16 ("Nowhere in the Constitution does it say a local lawyer
has to shut down their practice to make sure a person is represented properly. What it says is the
government will provide you with an attorney free of charge, and that is not being done right
now.").
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III. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY AND THE PUBLIC DEFENDER FOR THE
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT: "THE DETERIORATING SITUATION HAS
REACHED A CRITICAL MASS"
7 2
The Miami-Dade Public Defender's Office, which has been named
the nation's most outstanding public defender's office,7 3 has been strug-
gling to continue operations since the Legislature finalized the
2008-2009 budget in May 2008. However, this situation has been build-
ing slowly over time, with gradual decreases in funding over the years
culminating into the current crisis. Former Dade Public Defender Ben-
nett Brummer74 says that funding for his office has been "deteriorating
for many years."75 However, he stated that the current crisis is "the most
devastating time I've seen in thirty years. 76
The numbers support Brummer's statements. Since the beginning
of fiscal year 2007-2008, his office's budget has been cut by $2.48 mil-
lion, or 8.5 percent.7 7 In addition, the Legislature has imposed a one
percent quarterly cutback for fiscal year 2008-2009, which operates as
an additional four percent budget CUt. 78 In spite of the smaller budget,
caseloads have been rising. Between fiscal year 2003-2004 and fiscal
year 2006-2007, noncapital felony cases rose by 16.2 percent. 79 At the
same time, the office has had trouble retaining its attorneys. Because the
starting salary for attorneys is only $42,000 (about half the starting sal-
ary for other government positions in the area),8° young lawyers facing
the expiration of student loan deferrals or just seeking to pay the bills are
unable to do so on their assistant public defenders' salaries. 8' Dade's
public defenders have seen no raises for two out of the past five years
and there are no expectations of future raises.82 Some assistant public
defenders rely on their parents to make ends meet, while a number hold
72. Affidavit of Carlos Martinez at 4, In re Reassignment & Consolidation of Pub.
Defender's Motion To Appoint Other Counsel in Unappointed Noncapital Felony Cases, No.
3D08-2272 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Sept. 15, 2008).
73. 11th Circuit PD Honored Nationally, FLA. BAR NEWS, Jan. 15, 2008, at 15, 15.
74. Brummer served as the Eleventh Circuit Public Defender for thirty-two years and retired
at the end of 2008. He led PD- 11 through the majority of this crisis.
75. Jan Pudlow, Citing Financial Woes, PD Stops Accepting Cases, FLA. BAR NEWS, Aug. 1,
2008, at 1, 1.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 6.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Susannah A. Nesmith, In Debt, Young Lawyers Struggle To Make It, MiAMI HERALD,
May 1, 2007, at IB [hereinafter Nesmith, In Debt]; Susannah A. Nesmith, Lure of Higher Salaries
in Private Arena Hurts Retention Efforts, MsAMw HERALD, May 1, 2007, at 5B.
82. Pudlow, supra note 2, at 4.
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second jobs on nights and weekends.83 The result has been an annual
turnover rate of about twenty percent for the past five years.84 Many of
the public defender's attorneys leave to work at the Office of Criminal
Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel for the Third District (RCC-3),
where part-time attorneys are paid $50,000 a year.8 5 The Public
Defender's office is unable to compete with that salary for experienced
full-time attorneys, and leaving PD-Il for RCC-3 is especially attractive
because the part-time arrangement allows attorneys to earn additional
fees from private clients.86
The combination of these factors has created a dangerous cycle for
the Miami-Dade Public Defender's Office. This year's budget cuts have
forced the office to stop replacing attorneys who leave the office, which
creates more work for attorneys who remain, which in turn causes more
attorneys to leave.8 7 This cycle has dramatic consequences for day-to-
day operations at PD-11. Between August and November 2008, PD-11
lost four to five attorneys each month.88 By January 2009, only 96 attor-
neys were handling noncapital felonies.89
A. Individual Caseloads in PD-11 Compared to National and
State Standards
The inevitable result of an increasing volume of work and a
decreasing number of attorneys is more work for individual attorneys.
PD-1l's assistant public defenders are carrying caseloads that greatly
exceed any recognized standard for indigent defense counsel. While
there is no single nationally recognized caseload standard, 90 a variety of
national and state organizations have conducted studies and made rec-
ommendations as to how many cases an individual attorney can effec-
83. Nesmith, In Debt, supra note 81; see also Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part
Public Defender's Motion To Appoint Other Counsel in Unappointed Noncapital Felony Cases at
5, In re Reassignment & Consolidation of Pub. Defender's Motion To Appoint Other Counsel in
Unappointed Noncapital Felony Cases, No. 3D08-2272 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Sept. 3, 2008) [hereinafter
Order] ("[A] number of assistant public defenders hold second jobs on nights and weekends
simply to make ends meet.").
84. Pudlow, supra note 75, at 6.
85. Pudlow, supra note 2, at 4.
86. Pudlow, supra note 2, at 4.
87. Nesmith, supra note 2; see also Pudlow, supra note 2, at 4 ("A chain reaction is taking
place in which every attorney who leaves and cannot be replaced increases the workload and
inefficiency of the remaining attorneys. Those remaining attorneys also begin looking for other
employment.").
88. Pudlow, supra note 2, at 4.
89. Jan Pudlow, 11th Circuit PD Says His Office Is at "the Breaking Point," FLA. BAR NEWS,
Jan. 15, 2009, at 1, 5.
90. See OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, KEEPING DEFENDER
WORKLOADS MANAGEABLE 7 (2001) (discussing different methods for formulating a caseload
standard).
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tively take on.9 The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice
Standards and Goals (NAC) has recommended that full-time public
defenders accept a maximum of 150 felony cases in a year.92 The NAC's
standards, established in 1973, have been incorporated by the ABA's
Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice and have
"proven resilient over time."93
State organizations have determined different standards are appro-
priate for Florida's public defenders. Florida's Governor's Commission
established maximum caseload standards of 100 felony cases per year.94
However, the Florida Public Defender's Association determined that
public defenders should handle no more than 200 felonies per year.95
Regardless of which standard serves as the benchmark for accept-
able caseloads, PD-I l's caseload is far from acceptable. 96 In June 2008,
the average caseload was 387 noncapital felonies per attorney. 97 By
August 2008, then-Public Defender Bennett Brummer estimated that
individual caseloads were closer to 440 noncapital cases, and feared that
they would climb to 500 (more than triple the nationally recommended
maximum, and two and a half times the highest recommended state stan-
dard) in the coming months. 98
PD-II has also looked beyond the national standards themselves to
compare how these standards relate to the practice of criminal law by
other attorneys. For example, in Los Angeles, public defenders'
caseloads "are more in the range of 40 to 45 pending felonies at any one
time." 99 There has been no suggestion or indication that criminal cases
in Los Angeles are less complex or entail fewer legal issues than those
in Miami. Perhaps more disturbing is the difference in caseloads
between public defenders and private criminal defense attorneys in
Miami. One private attorney stated that he only handles 50-100 criminal
91. See id.
92. Id. at 8; Pudlow, supra note 75, at 6.
93. OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, supra note 90, at 8.
94. Pudlow, supra note 75, at 6.
95. OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, supra note 90, at 11.
96. Any determination of a caseload standard, or a comparison of caseloads to a standard,
requires a definition of a "case." PD-Il counts cases in the manner prescribed by the NAC, which
defines a case as "a single charge or set of charges concerning a defendant (or other client) in one
court in one proceeding." Public Defender's Post-Hearing Closing Statement in Support of
Motions To Appoint Other Counsel in Unappointed Noncapital Felony Cases Due to Conflict of
Interest at 12, In re Reassignment & Consolidation of Pub. Defender's Motion To Appoint Other
Counsel in Unappointed Noncapital Felony Cases, No. 3D08-2272 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. i1, 2008)
[hereinafter Public Defender's Closing Statement]. These standards count cases from the initial
appointment immediately after arrest. See id.
97. Pudlow, supra note 75, at 6.
98. Pudlow, supra note 75, at 6.
99. Public Defender's Closing Statement, supra note 96, at II.
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and personal injury cases per year because that is his "comfort level" for
providing competent representation.'0° He went on to say, "If I had to
handle 436 cases [a year], I would be up 24 hours a day, seven days a
week, 365 days a year . . . .I still would not be able to effectively
represent that many people."' 0 ' He further stated that he would hire four
associates in order to handle that number of cases. 10 2 The mere sugges-
tion that private attorneys in the same city would provide five times the
staff to handle the caseload that public defenders handle raises serious
constitutional and ethical questions.
Despite these alarming disparities and their implications, the
caseload numbers only tell part of the story. The raw number of cases
that an attorney handles does not accurately reflect the attorney's wor-
kload because attorneys' work entails more than representing their cli-
ents.'1 3 For example, the caseload numbers do not take into account time
that must be spent on administrative tasks, attending training sessions,
fulfilling supervisory responsibilities, or consulting with colleagues
about each other's cases-all tasks that are essential to keep a
defender's office functioning, but that detract from time spent working
on clients' cases and are not taken into account in determining
caseloads. 1°4 Thus, while caseload standards are a useful starting point
for evaluating the ability of public defenders to meet their constitutional
and ethical obligations, no attorney's workload can be accurately mea-
sured by the number of cases handled alone. 105
The Miami-Dade Public Defender has indicated that its caseload
numbers alone leave out a significant part of the story. PD- II has listed
a variety of unique "local factors" that increase the workload of its attor-
neys (without affecting the caseload statistics):
(1) the need for interpreters to interview clients and witnesses (and
the unavailability of those interpreters), (2) the remote locations of
clients detained pretrial and the amount of driving time to reach such
facilities, (3) the waiting time at such detention facilities because of a
lack of jail staff to escort clients and interview rooms, (4) the sched-
uling of cases "off-week" so that days when attorneys should be pre-
paring cases are instead spent in court, (5) the practice of having
100. Public Defender's Closing Statement, supra note 96, at 14.
101. Public Defender's Closing Statement, supra note 96, at 14.
102. Public Defender's Closing Statement, supra note 96, at 14.
103. OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, supra note 90, at 3.
104. OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, supra note 90, 3-4.
105. See ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, ABA, TEN
PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 2 (2002) ("National caseload standards
should in no event be exceeded, but the concept of workload (i.e., caseload adjusted by factors
such as case complexity, support services, and an attorney's nonrepresentational duties) is a more
accurate measurement." (footnotes omitted)).
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private counsel cases heard before PD-Il cases on calendar (resulting
in assistant public defenders waiting in court), (6) the (over)charging
decisions of the State Attorney, (7) waiting in court for specialized
prosecutors to appear, and (8) the lack of experienced prosecutors in
the courtrooms, requiring ... supervising prosecutors' [involvement]
in plea negotiations.' 
6
Ironically, the magnitude of the workload-caseload distinction has
likely been worsened in the past year by PD- 1l's attempts to remedy the
situation. By spending time seeking either more money from the Legis-
lature, or relief from a portion of the office's caseload, the Public
Defender is forced to take away more time that could be spent on client
cases.
B. PD-11's Motion to Appoint Other Counsel in Unappointed
Noncapital Felonies Due to Conflict of Interest
The lack of funds and glut of cases came to a head for PD- 11 in
2008, when the Miami-Dade Public Defender determined that his office
simply could not ethically defend its current clients and continue to take
on new ones. The result has been two years of litigation, marked by
alternating victories and defeats for PD-11.
In June 2008, Miami-Dade's Public Defender's Office began refus-
ing to represent certain indigent defendants because its attorneys were
already overburdened with existing clients. 107 Later that month, the
Miami-Dade Public Defender Bennett Brummer asked a Circuit Court
judge to allow his office to refuse all new non-capital felony cases
because his attorneys would be unable to perform their constitutional
duties relating to any new clients."0 8 On September 3, Circuit Judge
Stanford Blake granted the motion in part and denied it in part, ruling
that PD-11 could decline to accept appointments to "C" cases (third-
degree felonies) but that it would continue to fulfill its duties in all "A"
and "B" cases (first and second degree felonies).10 9
The State appealed the ruling, arguing that the Miami-Dade Public
Defender will have to "share the burden of falling state revenues" just
like every other state agency.' Before the order granting partial relief
could go into effect, the state filed an emergency motion for stay with
106. Public Defender's Closing Statement, supra note 96, at 13.
107. Nesmith, supra note 68.
108. Nesmith, supra note 2, at 4. The Florida Legislature created a statutory procedure by
which a public defender may move a court to appoint other counsel when the office has a conflict
of interest. FLA. STAT. § 27.5303(l)(a) (2007).
109. Order, supra note 83, at 6.
110. Eckholm, supra note 36.
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the Third District Court of Appeal."'I The Third District certified that
the case required immediate resolution by the Supreme Court of Florida
because it "passes upon a question of great importance,"' 12 but the
Supreme Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction." 13
The case returned to the Third District, which reversed." 4 The
court held that the public defender could not decline appointments as an
office on the ground that all its lawyers were overworked and therefore
conflicted." 5 Instead, the "trial court [must] determine whether counsel
is sufficiently competent ... on a case-by-case basis."" 6 The court fur-
ther found that PD-11 showed only that its attorneys were laboring
under an excessive caseload, and not that any individual clients were
actually receiving inadequate representation." 7 The court articulated a
new standard for assessing alleged conflicts of interest by overworked
public defenders: "Only after a defender proves prejudice or conflict,
separate from excessive caseload, may that attorney withdraw from a
particular case."' 18
Additionally, the Third District rejected PD-11's reliance on the
Rules of Professional Conduct as a basis for declining new appoint-
ments, finding that those rules "are only meant to apply to attorneys,
individually, and not the office of the Public Defender as a whole."''119
The court ultimately signaled its weariness with the public defender's
complaints about funding, stating that, "PDll's complaint that it
receives inadequate funding is not novel. Nor is our response."' 120 That
response culminated in a suggestion to leave the courts out of this dis-
pute, and instead take it to the legislature. 21
PD-11 continued the fight for manageable caseloads by pursuing
111. Pudlow, supra note 2, at 5.
112. Id.; see also FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(5) ("[The Florida Supreme Court] may review
any order or judgment of a trial court certified by the district court of appeal in which an appeal is
pending to be of great public importance, or to have a great effect on the proper administration of
justice throughout the state, and certified to require immediate resolution by the supreme court.").
113. State v. Pub. Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, 996 So. 2d 213, 213 (Fla. 2008).
114. State v. Pub. Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, 12 So. 3d 798, 806-7 (Fla. 3d DCA
2009).
115. Id. at 802-4.
116. Id. at 802.
117. Id. at 802-3 ("PD1 1 presented evidence of excessive caseload and no more...
[W]henever an attorney is burdened with an excessive caseload, there exists the possibility of
inadequate representation. . .However, there was no showing that individual attorneys were
providing inadequate representation.").
118. Id. at 806.
119. Id. at 803.
120. Id. at 805.
121. Id. ("[lit is not the function of this Court to decide what constitutes adequate funding and
then order the legislature to appropriate such an amount. Appropriation of funds for the operation
of government is a legislative function.") (citation omitted).
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dual avenues of litigation. The Public Defender's Office appealed the
Third District's reversal to the Florida Supreme Court, which granted
discretionary review. 122 Meanwhile, PD-11 also attempted to conform
its approach to the blueprints laid out by the Third District Court of
Appeal. This time, the Public Defender's Office moved to withdraw
from a single felony case because a single attorney had too many cases
to competently represent a single defendant. 123 The trial court consid-
ered the motion within the framework established by the Third District
Court of Appeal in Public Defender v. State, focusing on whether PD- Il
showed "individualized proof of prejudice."' 24 Citing Luckey v. Harris
and Scott v. State, the trial court decided that it could consider "the pos-
sibility of future harm [to the client] based upon the demands on an
assistant public defender's time" in making the prejudice determina-
tion. 125 Because the assistant public defender "show[ed] that he has been
able to do virtually nothing in preparation of [the defendant]'s defense,"
the court found that he had met his burden of demonstrating individual-
ized prejudice and granted the motion to withdraw. 126
The Third District Court of Appeal disagreed. The court quashed
the lower court's order, finding "no evidence of actual or imminent
prejudice to [the defendant]'s constitutional rights."' 27 Despite the trial
court's lengthy list of omissions by the assistant public defender, the
Third District found that "the prejudice is speculative" because PD-Il
did not "demonstrate[ ] that there was something substantial or material
that [the public defender] has or will be compelled to refrain from
doing."' 28 Given the list of serious omissions found by the trial court, it
is difficult to imagine the actions would meet the Third District Court of
Appeal's "substantial or material" standard. 29
It is, however, clear that at least in the Third District, the analysis
122. Pub. Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit v. State, No. SC09-1181 (Fla. May 19, 2010)
(order accepting jurisdiction).
123. Order Denying Public Defender's Motion to Declare Section 27.5303(1)(d), Florida
Statutes, Unconstitutional and Granting Public Defender's Motion to Withdraw at 1, State v.
Bowens, No. F09-019364 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 23, 2009) [hereinafter Bowens Order].
124. Id. at 8.
125. Id. at 9.
126. Id. at 10, I1 (explaining that the assistant public defender had not obtained a list of
defense witnesses from the defendant, taken any depositions, visited the crime scene, looked for or
interviewed defense witnesses, prepared a mitigation package or filed any motions in the case).
127. State v. Bowen, No. 3D09-3023, 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 9851, at *1, *5 (3d DCA July 7,
2010).
128. Id. at *5-6.
129. This may change, as the rulings on both of PD- Il's excessive caseload motions are before
the Florida Supreme Court. As noted above, the Court has accepted jurisdiction in Public
Defender v. State. At the time of publication, the briefs on jurisdiction for the State v. Bowen
motion are pending before the Florida Supreme Court.
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governing conflicts cases for public defenders is closer to that created in
Strickland than in Luckey and Scott. The court's reliance on a conflicts
test that resembles the constitutional standard for ineffective assistance
of counsel is problematic. The backward-looking prejudice requirement
espoused by the Third Circuit ignores the ethical responsibilities of the
affected attorneys and the rights of their clients. In the above cases, the
court has refused to allow the attorneys to withdraw. But, as explained in
the following section, the ethical rules arguably require them to with-
draw in order to comply with the Rules. The funding crisis has thus
created a paradox for the overworked attorney in the Miami-Dade Public
Defender's Office: You may not withdraw, but you must withdraw. The
indigent client with an overloaded attorney is in a worse position: Your
lawyer is aware he is too busy to put together an adequate defense, but
there is nothing he can do about it.
C. Ethical Rules Implicated
One of PD- lI's principal arguments in both its motions was that its
attorneys could not ethically represent their clients. 3 ° A comparison of
anecdotal evidence from Miami-Dade Public Defenders and the relevant
law suggests not only that PD-I l's assertion is true, but that the ethics
rules apply differently in practice to public defenders than to private
attorneys with paying clients.
Although PD-11 was partially successful in its lawsuit, this type of
litigation is not the ordinary way that the ethical obligations embodied in
Florida's Code of Professional Responsibility are enforced. Ordinarily, a
grievance is filed against an attorney with the Florida Bar and the attor-
ney is called before the Bar to defend him or herself. The rules are nor-
mally enforced through disciplinary proceedings against an attorney who
appeals against his or her will before the Bar; it is extremely uncommon
for a group of attorneys to sue the state for the opportunity to meet their
ethical obligations.
Despite the reality that attorneys working for the Public Defender's
Offices are rarely, if ever, called before the Florida Bar to defend them-
selves in disciplinary proceedings,13' the conduct of Miami-Dade Public
Defenders may constitute violations of four related ethical rules.
1. COMPETENCE
According to Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 4-1.1, "A lawyer
130. See Order, supra note 83, at 2; Bowens Order, supra note 123.
131. A WestLaw search revealed no cases where the Florida Bar took disciplinary action
against an attorney working as or for a public defender for violation of any of the Rules discussed
as a result of systematic underfunding or case overloads.
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shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent represen-
tation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation
reasonably necessary for the representation." A comment to the rule
explains:
Competent handling of a particular matter includes inquiry into and
analysis of the factual and legal elements of the problem .... It also
includes adequate preparation. The required attention and preparation
are determined in part by what is at stake; major litigation and com-
plex transactions ordinarily require more extensive treatment than
matters of lesser complexity and consequence.132
Thus, the language suggests that not only does the rule require all
attorneys to investigate the facts and law relevant to a client's case, but a
higher level of investigation and preparation is necessary when the
stakes are high enough to include the potential loss of the client's
liberty.
The preparation aspect of the competence rule, arguably its most
crucial aspect, 133 has proved problematic for PD-11's lawyers. During
the hearing on PD-11's June 2008 motion, both an assistant public
defender and a supervising attorney at PD-11 testified that "approxi-
mately an hour is all the time an assistant public defender has to inter-
view a client through the duration of the case." '134 PD-11 also has a
policy of not interviewing clients who are out of custody until after
arraignment, which is often three to four weeks after arrest. 35 This
means that the lawyer generally knows nothing about the client's case at
arraignment except what is written in the arrest form, which of course
does not contain exculpatory information necessary to build a
defense. 136
Excessive caseloads often force assistant public defenders to ask
for a continuance, which waives their clients' rights to a speedy trial
within 175 days.137 Assistant Public Defender Amy Weber testified that
she does not have time to visit crime scenes or to "fully prepare" for
depositions, and that she does "very little" investigation into her clients'
cases herself.138 She also explained how this is a result of the underfund-
ing of PD- II and the excessive caseloads. Ms. Weber testified that she
handles about fifty felonies at a time, and once had thirteen cases set for
132. FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-1.1 (2008).
133. Rory Stein, a PD-Il attorney, testified during the July 2008 motion hearing that "what an
attorney can do in trial 'is a factor of the preparation that they were able to do prior to court.'"
Public Defender's Closing Statement, supra note 96, at 6.
134. Public Defender's Closing Statement, supra note 96, at 4 (emphasis added).
135. Public Defender's Closing Statement, supra note 96, at 17.
136. Public Defender's Closing Statement, supra note 96, at 17.
137. Public Defender's Closing Statement, supra note 96, at 5.
138. Public Defender's Closing Statement, supra note 96, at 6.
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trial on the same day. 1 39 In his September 3 order, Judge Blake acknowl-
edged that these numbers are excessive, stating, "the evidence shows
that the number of active cases is so high that the assistant public
defenders are, at best, providing minimal competent representation to
the accused."' 4
However, Judge Blake did not mention that this type of conduct
normally exposes private attorneys to the risk of disciplinary sanctions
by the Florida Bar. Due to the reality that public defenders are over-
loaded, any violations of Rule 4-1.1. they commit due to time con-
straints often go unnoticed (or deliberately unrecognized) by the Florida
Bar, whereas private attorneys engaging in the same kinds of behavior
may be subject to disciplinary actions. 4' For example, in Florida Bar v.
Broome, a lawyer was suspended for one year after committing a series
of Rule violations that affected several clients, including a violation of
Rule 4-1.1.14' The conduct that led to this finding and the subsequent
discipline includes failure to investigate or perform legal work in cases
of criminal defendants she was hired to represent, 143 and waiver of a
clients' right to a speedy trial through the filing of a continuance (which
was required because the attorney was unprepared) without discussing it
with the clients."'4 Additionally, a lack of preparation has been ruled to
constitute incompetence even in civil matters, where no loss of liberty is
at stake. 14 5
The Florida Supreme Court has spoken on the issue of how an
excessive caseload affects the ability of public defenders to provide
competent representation. The Court has ruled that because of an exces-
sive backlog of cases in the appellate public defender's office, the public
139. Eckholm, supra note 36.
140. Order, supra note 83, at 4.
141. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Jordan, 705 So. 2d 1387, 1388-90, 1391 (Fla. 1998) (per curiam)
(holding that repeated failures to meet deadlines and inform client about case constitutes
incompetent representation); Fla. Bar v. Roberts, 689 So. 2d 1049, 1051 (Fla. 1997) (per curiam)
(holding that failure to provide competent representation is ethical violation even in the absence of
intentional misrepresentation or fraud); Fla. Bar v. Sandstrom, 609 So. 2d 583, 583, 585 (Fla.
1992) (per curiam) (holding that inadequate investigation into cause of death of client's alleged
murder victim constitutes failure to adequately prepare for representation of client and is grounds
for sixty-day suspension).
142. 932 So. 2d 1036, 1038, 1041 (Fla. 2006) (per curiam).
143. Id. at 1038-40.
144. Id. at 1040.
145. See, e.g. Fla. Bar v. Dabold, No. SC03-406, 2003 WL 23112705, at *1-2 (Fla. 2003)
(recommending ninety-one-day suspension as sanction for incompetence where attorney failed to
adequately prepare for a medical malpractice action by failing to fulfill pre-suit screening
requirements and failed to file the lawsuit within the limitations period); Fla. Bar v. Racin, No.
SC03-451, 2003 WL 23112712, at *12, *14-16 (Fla. 2003) (finding violation of Rule 4-1.1 in
four civil cases where attorney failed to complete work in a timely manner or to adequately
prepare for court dates and deadlines).
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defender had not provided an indigent defendant with effective represen-
tation. 14 6 The court stated that a lack of financial support by the legisla-
ture does not relieve the public defender of the duty to act competently
for each client. 147 PD-Il contends that although the lack of financial
support by the legislature does not excuse its attorneys from performing
their duty of competence, it is hampering their ability to fulfill that
duty. 148
2. DILIGENCE
A lawyer's duty of diligence is conceptually related to the duty of
competence. Under Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 4-1.3, "A lawyer
shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a cli-
ent." The comment to this Rule specifically states: "A lawyer's wor-
kload must be controlled so that each matter can be handled
competently."'149 As explained above, PD-Il's workload has not been
controlled to ensure the ability of its attorneys to handle their assigned
cases competently.
The comment to Rule 4-1.3 also states: "Perhaps no professional
shortcoming is more widely resented than procrastination."' 50 There is
no evidence that PD-l l's attorneys procrastinate in handling their cases;
however, there is substantial evidence that there are often significant
delays in the resolution of the office's cases. From the client's perspec-
tive, the result is the same. Regardless of whether a lawyer simply
procrastinates by putting work off, or is working long and hard hours on
an excessive number of other cases, the client's matter remains
unresolved. "A client's interests often can be adversely affected by the
passage of time or the change of conditions .... Even when the client's
interests are not affected in substance, however, unreasonable delay can
cause a client needless anxiety and undermine confidence in the law-
yer." ''" As discussed above, PD- lI's attorneys often must ask for con-
tinuances in their cases. 152 If an attorney seeks a continuance and then is
unable to certify readiness by the new trial date, the case can be delayed
for up to five years.' In contrast, a private attorney in Florida was
disciplined for failing to take action in a civil matter for a period of only
146. Hatten v. State, 561 So. 2d 562, 565 (Fla. 1990).
147. Id.
148. See Public Defender's Motion, supra note 2.
149. FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-1.3 cmt. (2008).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See Public Defender's Closing Statement, supra note 96, at 5.
153. Public Defender's Closing Statement, supra note 96, at 5; see also Eckholm, supra note
36 (explaining that, in some cases, delays in indigent defense systems have become so severe that
prosecutors were forced to drop charges against unrepresented defendants).
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seventeen months. 154
The Florida Supreme Court has ruled on this issue in the same way
as it ruled on the duty to provide competent representation. An excessive
case backlog in a public defender's office may preclude a public
defender from acting diligently, but a backlog resulting from a lack of
funding from the legislature does not relieve the public defender from
his duty of diligence with respect to each client. 55 Thus, the Court has
recognized that a lack of funding can force a public defender to fail to
meet ethical obligations, but it did not find that outcome acceptable.
Nevertheless, much of the procedure that is relatively normal at PD-Il
may form the basis for sanctions for private attorneys.'
56
3. COMMUNICATION WITH CLIENTS
The foundation of the attorney-client relationship is effective com-
munication. Rule 4.1-4 states:
A lawyer shall: (1) promptly inform the client of any decision or
circumstance with respect to which the client's informed consent...
is required by these rules; (2) reasonably consult with the client about
the means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished;
(3) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter;
(4) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information ....
A later subsection of the rule further states, "A lawyer shall explain a
matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make
informed decisions regarding the representation."
1 57
Like the prior two Rules, much of the behavior that constitutes vio-
lation of this Rule is punished if it is engaged in by private lawyers, but
not by lawyers providing indigent defense. 58 For example, Assistant
Public Defender Amy Weber stated she is unable to comply with this
rule. One of her clients, James A. Simmons, was charged with child
154. Fla. Bar v. Pierce, 498 So. 2d 431, 432 (Fla. 1986) (per curiam).
155. Hatten v. State, 561 So. 2d 562, 565 (Fla. 1990).
156. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Smith, 866 So. 2d 41, 46-47, 49 (Fla. 2004) (per curiam) (stating that
pattern of neglect over one and a half years, even without any prior disciplinary record, may result
in disciplinary action); Fla. Bar v. Whitaker, 596 So. 2d 672, 673-74 (Ha. 1992) (per curiam)
(imposing public reprimand where lawyer neglected to file suit and failed to communicate with
lawyer).
157. FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-1.4(b) (2008).
158. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Williams, 753 So. 2d 1258, 1259-60, 1261 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam)
(holding that failure to file documents on client's behalf and failure to maintain adequate contact
with client constitutes violation of Rule 4-1.4); Fla. Bar v. Jordan, 705 So. 2d 1387, 1388-91 (Fla.
1998) (per curiam) (finding that repeated failures to respond to phone calls from client and failure
to inform client of developments in her case amounted to ethical violation); Fla. Bar v. Jasperson,
625 So. 2d 459, 460-61, 463 (Fla. 1993) (per curiam) (finding that filing petition with bankruptcy
court on behalf of client that attorney had never met or advised constitutes violation of
disciplinary rules).
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pornography and was offered a plea that carried a one-year sentence.159
However, Weber was too busy to discuss the offer with him (although
he would have accepted it and ended his case). 160 Prosecutors gathered
more evidence and rescinded the offer, leaving Simmons with little
choice but to accept their new offer: a five-year sentence.16 1 By contrast,
in Florida Bar v. Murray, a private criminal defense attorney was dis-
barred for five years, in part for failing to follow through on a plea offer
made by the State that would have placed his client, who was subse-
quently convicted and sentenced as a habitual offender, on probation.
162
Less dramatic failures to properly communicate a plea offer occur
often at PD- 11. Because PD- II is unable to interview clients or investi-
gate cases prior to arraignment, 163 its attorneys are unable to counsel
clients so that they can make a knowing and intelligent decision about a
plea offer (which is often presented at arraignment)." In Broome, the
sanctioned attorney failed to properly advise a client facing criminal
charges so that he could make a knowing and intelligent decision about
whether to take a plea or go to trial.' 65 The client went to trial and was
convicted. 166 The attorney's failure to discuss the plea resulted in a find-
ing by the Bar that the lawyer had breached her duty to communicate
with her client, and contributed to the decision to suspend her from the
practice of law. 167
The lack of time to communicate with clients extends beyond sim-
ply the explanation of a plea. Rule 4-1.7 requires attorneys to "reasona-
bly consult" clients regarding the objectives of the representation and to
"promptly comply with reasonable requests for information." However,
PD-Il is often unable to keep clients informed about their cases.
According to the president of the Miami chapter of the Florida Associa-
tion of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the most common complaint he hears
from PD- lI's clients is, "I can't get them on [the] telephone .... I can't
meet them in person and I don't know who they are, and they spent...
ten minutes with me in the corridor outside the courtroom."' 168 Amy
Weber also testified that because she spends so little time with her cli-
ents, she is unable to facilitate effective communication because they do
159. Eckholm, supra note 36.
160. Eckholm, supra note 36.
161. Eckholm, supra note 36.
162. Fla. Bar v. Murray, 489 So. 2d 30, 30 (Fla. 1986).
163. Public Defender's Closing Statement, supra note 96, at 17.
164. Public Defender's Closing Statement, supra note 96, at 17.
165. Fla. Bar v. Broome, 932 So. 2d 1036, 1038 (Fla. 2006) (per curiam).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Public Defender's Closing Statement, supra note 96, at 4-5 (first and second alterations
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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not trust her.169
4. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
Fla. Bar Reg. R. 4-1.7 regulates conflicts of interest. The Rule deals
with more than simply the classic and most obvious conflict of interest
scenario, where one lawyer represents two clients whose interests are
directly adverse to each other (for example, a single lawyer represents
both the plaintiff and defendant in a civil lawsuit, or a single lawyer
represents criminal co-defendants who each wish to assert the guilt of
the other as their defense). The Rule states, in part, "A lawyer shall not
represent a client if ... there is a substantial risk that the representation
of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's respon-
sibilities to another client."17
The Florida Supreme Court has held that this type of "material lim-
itation" conflict may exist when a public defender is faced with an
extreme number of cases. The Court stated, "When excessive caseload
forces the public defender to choose between the rights of the various
indigent criminal defendants he represents, a conflict of interest is inevi-
tably created."' 71
PD-11 contends that this scenario is the reality at its office every
day. Several PD-11 attorneys testified at the July 2008 motion hearing
that the office is forced to practice "triage."' 72 Triage refers to the prac-
tice of prioritizing certain cases over others, and spending the most time
on those that are the most important.1 73 By definition, the practice of
triage "forces the public defender to choose between the rights of the
various indigent criminal defendants he represents."' 74 Thus, the sheer
number of cases PD-11 handles creates a conflict of interest.
IV. SOLVING THE PROBLEM
The ethical dilemma faced by Miami-Dade County's public defend-
ers and the resulting double ethical standard is a controllable problem.
However, solving it will require a collaborative effort from everyone
involved: the affected attorneys, the Florida Bar, and most importantly,
the Florida Legislature. These players are particularly important given
169. Public Defender's Closing Statement, supra note 96, at 4.
170. FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-1.7 (2008).
171. In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals, 561 So. 2d 1130, 1135 (Fla. 1990) (per
curiam); see also In re Certification of Conflict, 636 So. 2d 18, 19 (Fla. 1994) ("An inundated
attorney may be only a little better than no attorney at all.").
172. Public Defender's Closing Statement, supra note 96, at 5.
173. Margareth Etienne & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ.
L. REV. 295, 320 (2007).
174. In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals, 561 So. 2d at 1135.
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the courts' resistance to adopting the Luckey standard. While there are
different paths to coming to a solution, that solution must entail one
outcome: the public defender must be adequately funded.
A. What Affected Attorneys Can Do
Without assistance from other public officials, the power of indi-
vidual public defenders to affect their situation is limited. Public defend-
ers faced with excessive caseloads have two options: (1) continue taking
new cases and attempt to function as normally and effectively as possi-
ble; or (2) stop taking at least some new cases. Florida legislators and
the State Attorney's Office favor the first option. However, the Ameri-
can Bar Association firmly supports the latter. 7 ' The ideal strategy for
overworked appointed counsel is to take action designed to influence
appropriations decisions in the future.
1. DECLINE APPOINTMENT TO NEW CASES
In a formal ethics opinion, the ABA's Standing Committee on Eth-
ics and Professional Responsibility advises lawyers who represent indi-
gent defendants to refuse to accept new cases or to withdraw from
existing ones when the lawyers' caseload prevents them from providing
"competent and diligent" representation to their clients.' 76 Specifically,
the ABA recommends that a lawyer with an excessive caseload: (1)
transfer "non-representational responsibilities" to others within the
office; (2) refuse new cases; and (3) transfer current cases to another
lawyer within the firm who can reasonably handle additional cases. 177
While these alternatives may be viable when a single attorney in an
office is operating under an excessive caseload, two of the three options
offered by the ABA are not useful when an entire office is faced with
case overloads. When every attorney in an office has an excessive
caseload, there is no one to whom a lawyer can refer "non-representa-
tional responsibilities," and there is no one to whom a lawyer can trans-
175. The American Bar Association is not a governing body in the sense that its formally
issued ethics opinions are not binding on American lawyers or even on ABA members. However,
the ABA promulgates the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility, which are then incorporated
(often with changes) into many state codes of conduct and professional responsibility by their
respective state bar associations. State bar associations do govern the conduct of the lawyers they
license for practice and may issue binding ethics opinions or disciplinary sanctions. The Florida
Bar's Rules of Professional Conduct is based on the ABA Model Rules. Therefore, despite its
status as non-binding precedent, the ABA's interpretation of the appropriate response to this type
of ethical problem does have some precedential value, It is highly relevant in providing guidance
to public attorneys, as well as significantly persuasive authority for governing bodies like the
Florida Bar.
176. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'I Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-441 (2006).
177. Id. at 5.
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fer current cases. Thus, according to the ABA, the only way for an
attorney in PD-I l's position to meet his ethical and constitutional obli-
gations is to refuse to accept new cases.
This is especially true given the ABA's position on lawyer-supervi-
sors. The ABA places responsibility for managing caseloads on lawyers
who supervise public defenders.' 78 The Committee on Ethics and Pro-
fessional Responsibility stated that supervisors should monitor subordi-
nates' caseloads and work to provide a more manageable caseload for
any lawyer who is unable to meet his ethical duties due to an excessive
number of cases.' 7 9 Placing the burden for maintaining appropriate
caseloads on supervisors creates a powerful incentive for supervisors to
decline new cases, and often makes such action the best ethical
choice. 110
However, despite its relative attractiveness in desperate circum-
stances, litigation is not a long-term solution to this problem. While
seeking judicial permission to decline new cases yielded some recent
success for Miami-Dade's Public Defender in this case and in the past,
litigation is not a long-term solution. Miami-Dade Public Defender Car-
los Martinez is already calling the partial relief granted to his office in
September 2008 "purely academic." ''
Successful litigation yields temporary relief (nonappointment to
some new cases), which may ease the public defender's workload in the
short term, but does not affect the underlying causes of the problem that
prompted the litigation. A caseload/workload problem is more than just
a problem of having too many cases coming in-it is a structural flaw in
the state's indigent defense system. The real issue is not that there are
too many indigent defendants on a given day in Miami-Dade County;
the problem is that the Miami-Dade Public Defender does not have the
appropriate tools to constitutionally and ethically assist those indigent
defendants. Those tools include the funding to attract and retain enough
quality lawyers to represent their clients and to respond to rising num-
bers of cases. Additionally, litigation is expensive, even if the public
defender wins. Hiring private counsel on a case-by-case basis to
represent indigent defendants costs three to five times more than an
178. Id. at 1-2.
179. Id. at 7-8.
180. Id. at 8 ("If a supervisor knows that the subordinate's workload renders the lawyer unable
to provide competent and diligent representation and the supervisor fails to take reasonable
remedial action .... the supervisor himself is responsible for the subordinate's violation of the
Rules of Professional Conduct.").
181. Pudlow, supra note 89, at 1.
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appropriately funded public defender.' 82 The main long-term value in a
litigation strategy like that employed by PD-II is to signal the legisla-
ture that public defenders must be adequately funded in order to operate.
2. START WITH MISDEMEANORS
The State Attorney's Office and the Legislature have pointed out
that there are options other than declining felony appointments. The
State Attorney suggests that seeking to decline appointments in misde-
meanors rather than felonies is a better choice. 83 The State Attorney
also objected to the public defender's "chosen method to air his griev-
ances, ' 184 arguing that the better option is to "sit down and work these
things out.' 85 Legislators have also pushed for creative action. For
example, other public defenders have negotiated with local prosecutors
and judges to ensure that jail time will not be sought in certain types of
misdemeanor cases. If the accused does not face the possibility of incar-
ceration, the state does not have an obligation to appoint an attorney. 86
These are potential options for overworked public defenders who
are unable to meet ethical obligations. However, these solutions are
flawed. The main problem is that these are not permanent, across-the-
board solutions for Florida's public defenders. Whether these types of
strategies will work in any particular judicial circuit depends on many
details unique to that circuit. What works in Broward might be inappro-
priate for Miami-Dade, and the success of any remedy ultimately
depends on legislative action.
The first alternative, declining appointments in misdemeanors
rather than felonies, may be workable for some public defenders but is
not always feasible. For example, PD- Il stated that it considered declin-
ing misdemeanors rather than felonies, but chose not to do so because it
would not have a great enough impact on the workload of individual
attorneys. 87 Because felony cases are more expensive, time-consuming,
and the biggest contributor to the problem at PD-11, declining felony
182. Gary Blankenship, Criminal Law Section Sets Out To Find Court Budget Solutions, FLA.
BAR NEWS, Aug. 15, 2008, at 1, 5.
183. State Attorney's Response to Public Defender's Motion to Appoint Other Counsel in
Unappointed Noncapital Felony Cases 5-6, In re Reassignment & Consolidation of Pub.
Defender's Motion To Appoint Other Counsel in Unappointed Noncapital Felony Cases, No.
3D08-2272 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 11, 2008) [hereinafter State Attorney's Response]; see also Lee
Molloy, A Class C Defense, SUNPOST.COM, Sept. 11, 2008, http://www.sfltimes.com/index.php?
option=comcontent&task=view&id=2361&Iternid=144 (last visited Aug. 15, 2010).
184. State Attorney's Response, supra note 168, at 2.
185. Public Defender's Closing Statement, supra note 96, at 20.
186. Id.
187. Public Defender's Closing Statement, supra note 96, at 20-21.
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appointments will actually impact the public defenders' workloads. 188
Also, declining misdemeanors would destroy PD- II's "farm system," by
which new lawyers gain trial experience handling misdemeanors and are
later promoted to felonies.1 89 Without this training system, PD-Il would
be left without a way to train new attorneys to competently represent
defendants in felony cases.
The State Attorney's preferred plan of action for PD-11, "sitting
down and working things out," should of course be the first choice for
any public defender facing a funding problem. In the legal world, settle-
ment is almost always preferred over litigation, and this situation is no
different-obtaining more funding is obviously more ideal than suing to
halt the appointment of new cases. However, when "sitting down" does
not result in "working things out," an overworked public defender's
office must take further action. The Miami-Dade Public Defender is an
example of failed negotiations with the State. PD-11 repeatedly asked
the Legislature and courts for help, but assistance was not forthcom-
ing. 90 Although this option is always the first choice, it is often not the
last.
Avoiding appointment of public defenders through a "bulk plea
deal" with prosecutors is also not an ideal solution. This approach suf-
fers from the same temporariness problems as litigation. Additionally, it
undermines the purpose of the criminal justice system-the idea of this
system is to generate a legislature-created scheme for the criminalization
of certain activities that its constituents deem to be unacceptable, and
punishment for those who then engage in those activities. If the activity
is reprehensible enough to the public to be deemed a crime, it should be
punished accordingly; if it is not reprehensible enough to be punished, it
should not be designated a crime. A circuit-wide decision that some
activities are reprehensible enough to be criminal, but that they will nev-
ertheless not be punished as such, makes little sense in any scheme of
criminal justice. This raises a simple question: Why bother to legisla-
tively criminalize activities that cannot be truly treated as crimes by the
judiciary? This type of solution addresses one symptom of the problems
of underfunding and excessive caseloads for public defenders, but
wholly avoids the underlying causes of the problem.
B. The Florida Bar's Role
The legal profession has always been independent in the sense that
it is self-regulating. It is this independence that has allowed members of
188. Public Defender's Closing Statement, supra note 96, at 21.
189. Public Defender's Closing Statement, supra note 96, at 21.
190. Public Defender's Closing Statement, supra note 96, at 20.
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the Bar to maintain the integrity of the profession through the creation
and enforcement of the state rules of legal ethics and professional
responsibility.' 9 ' While full financial independence is not a realistic
aspiration, some participation in the appropriations decisions is a reason-
able goal. The Florida Bar should take a more active role in making
recommendations to the Legislature regarding how much money the
judicial branch, including the public defenders' offices, needs to operate.
While the Bar has taken some action already, more is needed.
1. ETHICS OPINIONS AS GUIDANCE TO PRACTITIONERS
AND LAWMAKERS
There is no Florida corollary to ABA Ethics Opinion 06-441. The
Florida Bar has not formally spoken directly on this issue in either an
advisory or disciplinary capacity. At a minimum, a published Florida
Bar ethics opinion like ABA Ethics Opinion 06-441 would afford the
state's public defenders with some leverage in making arguments similar
to those made by PD-II both during litigation to seek permission to
decline additional cases and in seeking more funding from the Legisla-
ture. An ethics opinion would not have the power to force the Legisla-
ture to appropriate more funds to the state's public defenders, but it
might encourage more public defenders facing excessive caseloads to
take action by signaling the Bar's support for such action. It would also
indicate the importance of professionalism to legislators who make
appropriations decisions. An ethics opinion that emphasizes the impor-
tance of protecting the constitutional rights of indigent defendants may
also push the courts toward adopting a Luckey-type approach to ineffec-
tive assistance claims seeking prospective relief.
2. DISCIPLINING PUBLIC DEFENDERS FOR ETHICAL VIOLATIONS
Even without taking a formal position, the Florida Bar may be bet-
ter able to influence how excessive caseloads are managed by public
defenders than the individual public defenders themselves.
One extreme way the Florida Bar could strongly and almost imme-
diately influence how funds are appropriated to the state's public
defender's offices is to strictly enforce the Rules of Professional Con-
duct. This means enforcing the rules with respect to public defenders in
the same way that the Bar enforces rules with respect to private attor-
191. See the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct, Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities,
FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl., for a brief discussion on the importance of the
independence of the judiciary and how that concept relates to the professional responsibility of
members of the Florida Bar.
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neys. 92 So far, state courts have recognized that overworked public
defenders may not be able to meet ethical obligations in one of two
ways: (1) finding for a convicted defendant in an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim; or (2) finding for a public defender's office that sues to
avoid taking on additional appointments. These types of rulings may be
sufficient to create a remedy for some defendants harmed by the work-
ing conditions of public defenders (assuming the defendant was con-
victed and is able to meet both prongs of the Strickland test), or for
granting temporary relief to an overworked public defender's office.
However, these proceedings do little to prevent the same harm from hap-
pening to a different defendant in the future. Ineffective assistance
claims and suits to decline additional appointments lack the deterrent
effect of a formal disciplinary proceeding initiated by the Florida Bar. In
Bar disciplinary proceedings, sanctions are assessed against an attorney
personally, and range in severity from a private reprimand to disbar-
ment. Attorneys have a serious incentive to avoid ethical violations that
carry the risk of Bar sanctions.
Of course, there are obvious practical reasons for the Florida Bar's
reluctance to initiate such actions against public defenders. No one
would suggest that the lawyers themselves are incompetent or unethical;
these types of violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct are a
result of conditions beyond the lawyer's control. It therefore seems that
punishing these lawyers would serve little purpose. Furthermore, no
lawyer would want to work as a public defender if it meant unavoidable
personal exposure to sanctions by the Florida Bar.
Thus, pursuing disciplinary actions against public defenders for
Rule violations that occur because of excessive caseloads would likely
discourage lawyers from seeking employment in a public defender's
office. Many lawyers working as public defenders would likely quit.
That result would cause the "chaos in the system" that the State Attor-
ney's Office for the Eleventh Circuit feared. 193 State Attorneys would
not be able to prosecute a massive number of cases because the State
could not appoint lawyers to defend the accused. The criminal justice
system would come to a grinding halt and the public would be outraged.
However, this extreme consequence would force the Legislature to take
swift and decisive action, namely, funding Florida's public defenders'
offices at a level that will not force them to violate the Rules of Profes-
sional Responsibility.
192. The ABA recommends equal treatment of all lawyers under the disciplinary rules and
urges judges to report violations of ethical rules by attorneys representing the indigent. See
GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 40, at 43-44.
193. See State Attorney's Response, supra note 168, at 3.
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3. COLLABORATIVE, INTERAGENCY PLANNING
A more viable option is collaboration between the Bar, public
defenders, prosecutors, and other criminal justice officials. The Span-
genberg Group advocates for the maintenance of a "constant dialogue
among judges, public defenders, and prosecutors about the need for bal-
anced funding and resources." '19 4 The reason for this dialogue is to
ensure that "potential supporters of public defenders [ ] understand the
complexities of providing effective indigent defense representation and
the vital need to uphold this constitutional right."' 95
A variety of states have pursued this strategy by creating commis-
sions or task forces consisting of representatives from different criminal
justice agencies, state and local government, and the judiciary. 96 Cali-
fornia, Georgia, Kentucky, and Nebraska have followed the Criminal
Justice Planning Commission Model, which "bring[s] together repre-
sentatives from key criminal justice agencies in a given jurisdiction to
conduct planning from a multiagency or systemwide perspective."' 197 In
California, the Los Angeles Countywide Criminal Justice Coordination
Committee (CCJCC) includes a wide range of officials from county and
municipal governments, including representatives from criminal justice
agencies as well as education, health, and human services.1 98 The
CCJCC has successfully implemented programs to reduce trial delays
and relieve jail overcrowding; make legislative proposals regarding
video arraignment, revenue collection, drug court diversion, and child
abuse; and develop a fully automated countywide link between the
courts and a proprietary justice agency data system. 199 Georgeia's Fulton
County Ad Hoc Committee on Criminal Justice, formed to implement
changes to the indigent defense system, has achieved similar success. 2°
What began as an ad hoc body became the permanent Fulton County
Justice System and Coordinating Committee, and now advises elected
officials on projects that benefit "all components of the criminal justice
system."'201 Notably, the Committee was able to secure more adequate
funding for the county's public defender's office, which had been "on
194. OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, supra note 90, at 25.
195. OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, supra note 90, at 25.
196. OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING STATE AND LOCAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS: A REPORT ON How PUBLIC DEFENDERS, PROSECUTORS, AND OTHER
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM PRACTITIONERS ARE COLLABORATING ACROSS THE COUNTRY 1 (1998),
available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/173391.pdf.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 2.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 2.
201. Id. at 2-3.
1348 [Vol. 64:1317
BETWEEN SOUTH BEACH AND A HARD PLACE
the verge of collapse" before the formation of the Ad Hoc Committee.2 °2
Broad-based task forces have also been effective in bringing about
changes in indigent defense.2 3 This model brings together representa-
tives from criminal justice agencies, the legislature, the judiciary, and
the executive branch to work together on a particular problem.21 "The
common ground found by task forces addressing problems in the indi-
gent defense system can result in sensible, broadly-supported proposals
to improve indigent defense within the context of the overall criminal
justice system. ' 20 5 Another major selling point for this type of collabora-
tive planning is that proposals backed by most components of the crimi-
nal justice system and representatives from all three branches of state
government "are difficult for policymakers to reject. 2 06
This approach has worked in Florida in the past. The Florida "Fill
the Gap" Coalition was created to demonstrate to the Legislature during
its 1995 session that more funding was needed for courts, prosecution
and public defense.2 7 The Legislature had slated significantly increased
funding for law enforcement (termed "the front end" by the Coalition)
and corrections ("the back end"), without a corresponding increase for
courts, prosecution and defense ("the middle").208 The Coalition suc-
cessfully advocated for the Legislature to "fill the gap" in funding,
resulting in doubled budget increases for the "middle" components for
fiscal year 1996 than in fiscal year 1995.209
C. The Legislature
Ultimately, resolving the problems presented by excessive
caseloads for public defenders is in the hands of the Florida Legislature.
All of the actions that can be taken by affected attorneys and the Florida
Bar are designed to encourage action by the Legislature. To ensure that
public defenders can meet their ethical and constitutional obligations,
the Legislature needs to listen to the Judiciary and allocate more money
to the third branch of government.210
The state's budget as a whole is facing more problems than ever
before. Legislators and members of other state agencies have not been
202. Id. at 2-3.
203. See GIDEON's BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 40, at 36-37.
204. OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, supra note 196, at 5.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 6.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See Mishory, supra note 43 ("We have to have an open dialogue with the other branches
of government and continue to press upon them the importance of the third branch.").
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receptive to PD- l's requests for help, taking the position that public
defenders must deal with budget cuts just like everyone else."' How-
ever, the public defenders, and the court system in general, cannot be
treated like any other state agency. Other state government agencies are
better able to absorb budget cuts because they can cut certain projects or
activities. The court system is different because "it has a very specific,
circumscribed mission: judges, magistrates and court support personnel
are there for only one essential purpose-to ensure that society has a
forum for the peaceful and orderly resolution of disputes in a timely
manner." '12 Whereas another agency can decide to eliminate a particular
project or activity, the courts cannot decide to stop hearing particular
cases and public defenders cannot decide to stop satisfying their ethical
obligations to certain defendants.
The Legislature can better fund public defender offices like PD-Il
by adequately funding the court system as a whole, and by considering
the budgetary effects of laws they pass. There are two commonly prof-
fered approaches for achieving this goal: designate to the courts either a
fixed percentage of the state budget or a dedicated source of funding.'1 3
Each has its drawbacks. A designation of a fixed percentage of the
budget will likely be difficult to obtain." 4 However, a dedicated funding
source is problematic because the Legislature may simply reduce the
amount of general revenues allocated to the judiciary by an identical
amount. 1 5 Nevertheless, dedicating court access fees to fund the court
system (via a trust fund) is pragmatic and supported by the court system
itself.2 1 6 Currently only a small portion of revenue from court filing fees,
fines and costs is dedicated to the courts. 17 Instead, "people continue to
pay filing fees for timely justice, but the justice they are receiving is
being delayed."' 8
Regardless of how the Legislature chooses to fund Florida's public
211. See Susannah A. Nesmith, Miami-Dade Public Defender: Attorneys for Poor Vow To
Spurn Most Felony Cases, MIAMI HERALD, June 3, 2008, at IA (reporting that one state senator
viewed the public defender's refusal to accept felonies as "grandstanding," while the state
attorney's office called the action "too absurd to contemplate").
212. OFFICE OF THE STATE COURTS ADM'R, SEVEN PRINCIPLES FOR STABILIZING COURT
FUNDING 1 (2009).
213. Blankenship, supra note 64, at 5.
214. See id. Former State Senator Rod Smith is pessimistic about the probability that the
legislature would agree to a fixed percentage arrangement: "[T]he answer is plainly the
Legislature is never going to designate dollars in that fashion. If that's going to happen, that is
something that will have to be imposed from the outside." Id.
215. Id.
216. OFFICE OF THE STATE COURTS ADM'R, supra note 212, at 3.
217. Id.
218. Id.
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defenders, PD- lI's plight demonstrates that an adequate level of funding
is necessary, and that it can not wait.
V. CONCLUSION
The growing crisis in indigent defense is much bigger than Miami-
Dade County or the state of Florida. Indigent defense systems nation-
wide are struggling to provide adequate representation to their clients.
While the crisis at PD-II in Miami-Dade County is a small part of the
story, it is an important and an illustrative one. It is the nation's fourth
largest public defender's office in one of the nation's largest and poorest
metropolitan cities. But perhaps the most important aspect of PD-11's
role in the national story is that it has been hailed as the nation's best
public defender's office. Despite its budgetary problems, PD-I I may
serve as a model for other public defenders across the nation. Comment-
ing on what this suggests about the state of indigent defense in the
United States, counsel for Bennett Brummer said, "The reputation of the
degree of professionalism at PD-II is national, if not international. It's
widely considered one of the best public defender offices there is. Then
you must shudder and wonder: What is the worst?"219
The fact that public defenders in Florida and elsewhere are rarely, if
ever, called before disciplinary bodies to defend ethical violations due to
case overloads is not evidence that there is no problem in the current
system. This absence of disciplinary action should also not be inter-
preted to mean that the existing problems are not fundamentally impor-
tant. This problem is incredibly important, because it creates a double
ethical standard for attorneys with indigent clients and attorneys with
paying clients. This double standard, in turn, encourages sub-par repre-
sentation for the poor that falls short of ethical and constitutional stan-
dards, despite the best efforts of Miami-Dade's public defenders. The
unavoidable result of a persistent failure to meet constitutional mini-
mums for indigent clients is an undermined confidence in the judicial
process.
220
Adequate funding for public defenders in Miami-Dade County and
nationwide is the answer to the ethical and constitutional concerns raised
by the crisis in indigent defense. Without sufficient resources for public
defenders, the famous words of Gideon are just words, a guarantee of
little more than a companion at arraignment.
219. Jan Pudlow, Judge Allows l1th PD To Stop Taking Cases, FLA. BAR NEWS, Sept. 15,
2008, at 1, 6.
220. Christensen, supra note 50 ("You don't want people in the community thinking there is
one kind of justice for the rich and one kind for the poor.").
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